BU 3027. Stuart recce tank and Comet of 23rd Hussars 11th Armoured Division 3 April 1945.

BU 3928. The British Army arrives at Belsen concentration camp. A Comet tank of 11th Armoured Division passes the camp gate.

BU 827. A Sherman Firefly tank and infantry of 11th Armoured Division during the advance in Belgium 10 September 1944.

Operation Goodwood in Normandy, France was a British offensive against the German forces at the end of July 1944. It is called by some historians as ‘the

Vickers Medium Tank Mark 2 The standard British tank of the inter-war years, the Vickers Medium Mark 2 was based on a design from not long after World War

Photograph by H.C. Casserley. A digitally restored image from a very poor quality original negative in my collection.

Operation Goodwood in Normandy, France was a British offensive against the German forces at the end of July 1944. It is called by some historians as ‘the

Operation Goodwood in Normandy, France was a British offensive against the German forces at the end of July 1944. It is called by some historians as ‘the

B 10776. An Achilles tank destroyer of 75th Anti-Tank Regiment 11th Armoured Division Royal Artillery Holland 12 October 1944.

B 10255. A Sherman tank of 11th Armoured Division passing through Leende 22 September 1944.

Operation Goodwood, in July 1944, was possibly the most controversial Allied offensive of the Normandy campaign. Launched with an entirely unprecedented level of air support, it was ultimately halted by determined German resistance south and southeast of Caen, not least from units in and around the village of Cagny. Operation Goodwood was launched on 18 July 1944. Although northern Caen had fallen to the Allies during Operation Charnwood, earlier in the month, southern Caen had still not been taken. To the south of the city, the Germans had established four defensive belts ten miles deep. These comprised (1) infantry, (2) panzer grenadiers, (3) fortified villages with anti-tank guns and mortars, and (4) defensive positions running across higher ground from the Bourguébus Ridge in the southwest to Troarn in the east. Beyond the fourth belt was an armoured reserve – Panther and Tiger tanks of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer divisions Montgomery was rapidly losing the confidence of Eisenhower and his deputy, Tedder, but he was not quick to embrace the prospect of another offensive. By 1944, the British army was confronted by the looming prospect of a manpower crisis, and there had already been extremely heavy casualties among the infantry since D-Day. Montgomery was reluctant to worsen an already difficult situation. However, since the landings, British armour had been building up steadily in the eastern sector of the beachhead. Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey of Second British Army now came to Montgomery’s aid by devising a plan to use it in a new offensive – Operation Goodwood. Dempsey believed that the country south of Caen would be particularly suited to armoured warfare. He had been favourably impressed by the bombing of Caen during Charnwood, and felt that similar techniques might be applied to clear a path for his armour to advance down a mile-wide corridor east of Caen into the Caen-Falaise plain to the south. However, at the time, Allied intelligence did not appreciate the depth of German defences to the south of Caen. Montgomery accepted Dempsey’s plan and quickly won Eisenhower’s support for it. Yet there was always a lack of clarity over the precise objectives of Operation Goodwood. Eisenhower and Tedder thought Montgomery was proposing a breakout from the beachhead; this was implicit in Dempsey’s operational order, which referred to Falaise as an objective. Montgomery also told the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that Falaise was his goal. But he then changed the directive to the principal corps commander, Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor (commanding 8 Corps). The revised directive proposed the establishment of the three armoured divisions of 8 Corps in the northern part of Caen-Falaise plain, but not a breakout to Falaise. Tap/click to enlarge. In planning the bombing for Operation Goodwood, the Allies sought to learn lessons from Charnwood, when craters and rubble had impeded ground offensive. The bombs and fuzes used on the main Goodwood axis of advance were chosen to avoid cratering. Additionally, the interval between the bombing and the start of the ground assault was reduced to take maximum advantage of the disorientation bombing was expected to cause among enemy troops. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed later, it proved very difficult to move the British armour forward rapidly after the bombing, and in sufficient strength. It is also important to remember that Goodwood was a very different operation from Charnwood. In Charnwood, Bomber Command targeted two clearly defined boxes on the northern outskirts of Caen. In Goodwood, the bombing was undertaken by three forces – Bomber Command, the heavy bombers of the US Eighth Air Force, and the medium bombers of the US Ninth Air Force. Moreover, 8 Corps devised an integrated air and artillery bombardment concept in which the aerial bombing was spread around no fewer than eleven separate zones – the two flanks, the northern section of the corridor, and the southern end of the corridor. With hindsight, there seems little doubt that this plan was far too complex. At its deepest, the bombing area was about six miles; at its broadest it was the same distance. Although a much greater weight of bombs was used than at Caen, about 70 per cent of the planned tonnage was aimed at the flanks against identified German concentrations or to impede counter-attacks; the remaining 30 per cent was divided between the northern and southern sectors of the corridor. The density of bombing planned for the corridor was between a quarter and a third of that planned for Operation Charnwood and was only about half that planned for Operation Cobra – in the American sector – a few days later. In the northern area of the corridor, this was not particularly significant because the aerial bombardment was supplemented by a massive artillery barrage, but difficulties arose further south, beyond the artillery’s range, owing to the depth and dispersal of German units. After Goodwood, some Army officers argued that the weight of the attack should have been shifted from the flanks to the southern sector of the corridor, but this view was based on the assumption that all the bombers available had been used in Goodwood. In fact, both Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force could have sent more aircraft to participate in the operation; only about half the Eighth Air Force’s bombers took part. More aircraft would almost certainly have been made available if Dempsey had asked for them. The truth is that neither the Army nor the Allied air forces had a clear grasp of the weight or density of bombing that would be necessary to suppress the German defences southeast of Caen. There was hardly any past experience by which to measure the effort that would be required. The scale of the Operation Goodwood air attack was unprecedented; never before had so many heavy and medium bombers been assigned to the support of ground troops. Some 1,512 heavy bombers and 343 mediums took part, delivering a total of 6,000 1,000lb bombs and 9,600 500lb bombs, and also many smaller general purpose and fragmentation bombs. Bomber Command struck first. Weather conditions were clear and the bombing was very accurate by the standards of the day: about half the planned density per acre was achieved. Enemy forces on the two flanks were neutralised, and the third zone, around Cagny, was also bombed accurately. Nevertheless, as we shall see, German defences in this area played a key role in thwarting Montgomery’s plans. Cagny, a Bomber Command target, was accurately attacked; an aircraft is visible in the top right corner Cagny after the bombing on 18 July 1944 Sannerville, on the eastern flank of the armoured corridor, was devastated by the preliminary bombing The US bombers were next. By the time they arrived, visibility had deteriorated, and many aiming points were obscured by smoke and dust from the British bombing. Nearly one quarter of the medium bombers did not attack, along with 72 of the 643 heavy bombers, and the medium bombers were unable to bomb accurately: they achieved only about one eighth of their planned mean bomb density in the northern corridor. The heavy bombers did better, but still only achieved about one fifth of their planned mean bomb density. At the southern end of the corridor, American aircrews delayed bomb release because of their concern to avoid friendly casualties on the ground, and many bombs fell long of the target areas – some by as much as four miles. This is not to say that shortcomings in the aerial bombardment were primarily responsible for Goodwood’s failure. More accurate bombing in the corridor, particularly in the south, would probably have helped 8 Corps, but Dempsey’s basic concept of using heavy bombing in support of the offensive in this sector was fatally flawed. The German defences covered too large an area, and were too dispersed for bombing to be able to punch a hole right through them. The bombing plan did not address the problem of the German armoured reserves at all. Several obstacles confronted the armoured assault. The launch area – the small British bridgehead east of the Orne – became very congested, and the corridor itself was narrow. There were also minefields to negotiate and a number of railway embankments. The armoured divisions – subdivided into their component brigades and battalions – had to move forward one at a time, and it proved to be a slow and laborious process. Time was of the essence. It was vital to exploit the psychological effects of bombing and the artillery barrage on the defenders rapidly, before they wore off. Yet it took too long to move 8 Corps south in sufficient strength. In the southern area of the corridor, where the bombing had been least accurate, the Germans began to recover, and 8 Corps’ lead formation, 11th Armoured Division, were confronted by strengthening opposition. After a substantial proportion of their motorised infantry became embroiled in clearing defenders from two villages along the corridor, 11th Armoured Division’s tanks pressed further south. Increasingly potent German resistance meanwhile slowed the advance of the second armoured division – the Guards Armoured Division. And so it was that only 11th Armoured Division attacked Bourguébus Ridge on the 18th. Confronted by a strong and well-prepared adversary bolstered by the arrival of armoured reserves, they stood no realistic chance of breaking through. On the following day, 8 Corps’ armour and infantry reached the area in greater strength, and heavy fighting continued south of Caen for another 24 hours, but the projected breakout towards Falaise remained as elusive as ever. One of the most decisive tactical actions during Operation Goodwood’s first day occurred at the village of Cagny, which lay towards the south of the armoured corridor. The village was targeted accurately by Bomber Command during the initial air bombardment. The German defences in Cagny and the nearby villages comprised elements of 21st Panzer Division commanded by Major Hans von Luck. They included two battalions of panzer grenadiers, artillery and self-propelled guns. Von Luck’s account of the subsequent fighting at Cagny has been retold many times over the years but not always very faithfully. Returning from leave in Paris early on 18 July and still clad in dress uniform, he missed the Allied bombing but arrived at his command post at Frénouville to discover that all communication had been lost with his divisional headquarters and the more forward units. He therefore set out in a command tank for Cagny. He found the village in ruins and saw the tanks of 11th Armoured Division streaming past to the west. Major Hans von Luck Deciding that there was no hope for his forward units, von Luck was on the point of returning to Frénouville to organise a new defence line, when he saw the barrel of a single cannon pointing skywards over a wall near the church. Investigating further, he found a battery of four 88mm flak guns manned by Luftwaffe crews, which had somehow survived the bombing. The famous ‘88’ was a dual-purpose gun. Under the Luftwaffe, it functioned primarily in the anti-aircraft role, but it could also be used as an anti-tank gun, and ‘88’ batteries in Normandy were usually equipped with armour-piercing shells as well as anti-aircraft ammunition. Von Luck found the Luftwaffe commanding officer - a captain - and ordered him to move his guns to the northern edge of the village to engage the British tanks. The man refused, stating that he was under Luftwaffe command and that the ground battle was none of his business. Von Luck’s response was to draw his pistol and ask the captain if he wished to be killed or decorated. He opted for decoration. They both then made their way to an apple orchard on Cagny’s northern perimeter that offered clear views out across the arable fields, and von Luck gave orders for the battery to be moved to this new position. He told the Luftwaffe captain: ‘The corn over there is so high that you will be well protected and just have a field of fire across it.’ He also gave instructions to ignore the forward tanks and target those coming from the north instead. The guns were duly deployed, while von Luck returned to Frénouville. An 88mm flak gun used in Operation Goodwood, sometimes wrongly depicted as one of the Cagny guns, Back at his command post, von Luck discussed the situation with a number of other officers, including Major Alfred Becker, who informed him that two of his assault gun batteries would ‘be going into action at any minute on the right flank’. Becker also described how a Major Kurz had already set up a defensive front in this area. Later, von Luck returned to Cagny, stopped by the church and ran to the position still occupied by the Luftwaffe battery. ‘In the extensive cornfields to the north of the village stood at least 40 British tanks, on fire or shot up. I saw how the tanks that had already crossed the main road were slowly rolling back. Becker’s assault guns had also joined in the battle. From the right flank, they shot up any tank that tried to bypass the village.’ The British perspective on these events has most commonly been associated with one particular element of 11th Armoured Division - Second Battalion, Fife and Forfar Yoemanry. The Fife and Forfars’ were the first to come under heavy fire from Cagny, with predictably dire consequences for the British tanks. To the southwest, the battalion commander realised that the units behind him had come under attack and ordered his motorised infantry to take the village. However, the divisional commander, Major General ‘Pip’ Roberts, then learnt of the order and cancelled it, determined that there should be no loss of momentum and anxious to conserve his remaining infantry. Instead, he passed on the problem of Cagny to the Guards Armoured Division, telling them that it was ‘strongly held’. Heeding this intelligence, the Guards approached the village with great caution and took the whole afternoon to capture it. A considerable gap developed between 11th Armoured Division and the Guards, and, as we have seen, only 11th Armoured Division reached the Bourguébus Ridge on 18 July. With hindsight, Roberts later blamed himself for passing an unduly pessimistic assessment of German strength at Cagny to the Guards. The Guards have also faced criticism for their alleged timidity. Yet the evidence suggests that neither of these critiques is entirely justified. For many years, histories of Operation Goodwood tended to focus too much on the story of the Luftwaffe 88s at Cagny. Their precise location was something of a mystery and was the subject of much disagreement. Other aspects of von Luck’s account, notably his references to Becker's assault guns, received far less attention, although it was firmly established that at least one Pak 43 88mm anti-tank gun also participated in the village’s defence. A Pak 43 88mm anti-tank gun and its wheels at Cagny; this air photograph was taken in 1946. Possibly the same gun or one very nearby, photographed after Cagny was captured during Operation Goodwood. Another view of the same position. The same location today (Google Earth). Location of the Pak 43s More recently still, historians of Goodwood have studied air photographs taken on 18 July 1944 in the heat of battle. There has been particularly close scrutiny of imagery captured by a 16 Squadron Spitfire, which showed the north-west quarter of Cagny - extensively bomb-damaged - and the fields beyond, where several destroyed British tanks were clearly visible. However, there seemed to be no sign of von Luck’s 88mm flak guns. At best, only a few vehicles that were presumed to be German could be spotted. One of the 16 Squadron photographs of Cagny, taken between 1130 and 1200 on 18 July 1944. The most obvious problem involved in using this imagery to support historical investigation is the lack of resolution. Artillery weapons do not possess solid shape and mass. The only significant mass is located in the breech area, so artillery pieces often appear in wartime air photographs as little more than black spots. Extremely high resolution is necessary to disclose anything more. Second World War guidance to photo interpreters on the identification of artillery batteries focussed entirely on the tell-tale signs of gun emplacements and other prepared positions - not on the guns themselves. Also, mobile guns were frequently sited under trees, where they were invisible to aircraft. There were areas of tree cover west and north of Cagny that could have concealed tactical objects from the eye in the sky, as well as areas where such objects would have been very hard to distinguish because the ground had been severely scarred by bombing. By contrast, tanks have considerably greater mass and usually show up more clearly from the air; a number are indeed immediately visible in the 16 Squadron photos. Yet many others are hard to spot. Their tendency to blend into the Normandy wheat fields was exacerbated by the fact that, during Goodwood, the vast majority were covered in dust, and tanks that had burned out typically became discoloured too. For all of these reasons, their presence in the air photos was often revealed only by tracks through the crops. Thus, it is important that we should understand the limitations of the air photographs. And yet the 16 Squadron images do reveal the location of the Cagny defences with a fair degree of clarity for a reason unwittingly identified by the late Ian Daglish in an appendix of his book, Over the Battlefield: Operation Goodwood. There, he provided the following commentary, including references to a British Army battlefield tour: Apart from the industrial estates of Caen, which nowadays spread across the western flank of the armoured corridor, the most conspicuous change from 1944 to be noted on a summer’s day is the appearance of the modern crops. Today’s much-modified strains are designed to direct more of their energy into the edible crop rather than the stem; in 1944, the ripening corn stood much taller. One point which the Battlefield Tour states entirely correctly is that “during the battle, the crops were shoulder high and it was hard to locate such field defences as were sited in the intervening ground.” Then, as in all previous summertime battles of European history, wheat grew to the height of a man’s shoulder or higher. Examining the photos, a former colleague - an ex-RAF intelligence officer and an experienced imagery analyst - asked me the question: ‘What do you suppose these lines are?’ Sure enough, at high magnification, it was possible to see more or less straight lines running across the photograph, chiefly between Cagny and the advancing British tanks. He postulated that they might have been caused by artillery shells passing through fields of wheat, but it was Daglish who provided confirmation by establishing that the crops were so much taller than those grown today. Subsequent re-examination of von Luck’s memoirs pointed to the same conclusion. In his description of the action at Cagny, he described how ‘The 8.8cm cannons were firing one salvo after the other. One could see the shots flying through the corn like torpedoes.’ In the process, they flattened the crops and left tracks that showed up clearly from the air. In their appearance and orientation, the tracks were entirely different to 11th Armoured Divisions numerous tank tracks, which also featured prominently in the imagery. The shells left single tracks, whereas the tanks always left two. Moreover, the orientation of the shell tracks - from south and east to north and west - differed completely from that of the tanks, which were moving from the north towards the south and southwest. Further compelling evidence lay in the fact that, in areas of the photographs, several shell tracks suddenly disappeared at field boundaries. This reflected their passage from fields of high wheat into fields with lower-standing crops or wheat that had already been harvested; wheat sheaves were actually present in at least two areas, where several shell tracks abruptly stopped. Elsewhere, shell tracks ended at the carcasses of destroyed British tanks or narrowly missed them. The main defended locations in Cagny suggested by the shell tracks. Some of the British tanks destroyed or disabled northwest and west of Cagny on the morning of 18 July 1944. There are undoubtedly more in this photograph, but they are extremely difficult to identify with certainty. Recorded in the photographs was the precise trajectory of the German artillery shells. This meant, of course that the lines could be traced back to their points of origin to show where the guns were. There were evidently several variables that determined the propensity of shells to leave visible tracks. Apart from the height of the wheat and progress with the harvest, these would have included the height of the guns from the ground, their elevation and aim. Nevertheless, such tracks as can be clearly identified confirmed that the guns were not deployed in a single area of Cagny but were spread along woods and hedgerows north and northwest of the village, where a pronounced right-angle feature is created by the field boundaries. Some guns were positioned east to west on Cagny’s northern edge, from where they could fire north and northwest. Some were lined up south to north on a field boundary and were positioned to fire west. A considerable number of shell tracks are visible in this area, and objects can be seen at track points of origin. These have too much mass to be artillery pieces. Moreover, while some points of origin are occupied, others are not. It therefore appears that there were tanks and/or self-propelled guns in this area, possibly including Becker’s assault guns, which were actually converted French Hotchkiss tanks. In summary, by the time this photograph was taken, the British tanks would have been confronted by a murderous crossfire. German positions extending north from Cagny revealed by shell tracks through the wheat. The photographs suggest that the Germans were using tanks or assault guns in this area; the object arrowed here has the appearance of a tank. This object has too much mass to be a static artillery gun and is probably an assault gun. One of Becker's assault guns in Normandy There is but one location in the photographs that conforms with von Luck’s description of where the Luftwaffe 88s were positioned. This is the only point northwest of Cagny church where an orchard opens straight on to the wheat fields north of the village, and where there would have been unimpeded views across these fields. It is also served by a direct road from the church, along which the guns could easily have been transported. Most of all, it is the only location on the northwest edge of Cagny from which multiple shell tracks emanate. However, while several military objects are visible in the imagery, the guns are impossible to identify with certainty. Lack of resolution, tree cover and severe bomb scarring all reduce the utility of the photos in this area. The objects arrowed here may be the Luftwaffe 88s; the shell tracks reveal that a considerable volume of fire was directed north and northwest from this area. The same objects can just be made out in this oblique air photograph taken by 430 Squadron; also captured in the image is a single clear shell track that leads back to this area. Enlarged, the objects are clearer; shadow is also visible, demonstrating that they are three-dimensional. Otherwise, apart from the Pak 43, just a single object in the imagery has the basic shape of an artillery gun. This can be seen in a field immediately north of Cagny. Its barrel is visible and is pointing in the direction of the British armoured corridor. The gun is also clearly the point of origin for at least one of the shell tracks through the wheat. One of the guns of Cagny and the orientation of the shell track. Again, the dimensions of the gun are somewhat clearer when the photo is enlarged. An associated and equally enduring part of the Cagny story concerns the fate of two German Tiger 1 tanks, part of 3 Company, 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, under Lieutenant Richard Freiherr von Rosen. The company had been positioned at Emiéville, northeast of Cagny, on the morning of 18 July and had suffered heavy losses during the bombing that preceded the British armoured offensive. Nevertheless, von Rosen succeeded in extricating six tanks and began an advance west towards the defended farm of Le Prieuré at about 10 AM. Subsequently, to skirt an area of woodland and keep it between his force and the British armour to the west, he turned south towards Cagny. Then, following an engagement with two British Shermans, he lost two of his Tigers in rapid succession. Both suffered penetrations of their thick frontal armour, suggesting fire from powerful anti-tank weapons positioned ahead of them. Unnerved and unable to pinpoint the source of the incoming fire, von Rosen decided to withdraw. For many years since, 3 Company’s fate has been the subject of much speculation. To some, at least, it appeared quite plausible that the two Tigers were the victims of friendly fire: that they were targeted by the four Luftwaffe 88s. Others have cast doubt on this proposition. The imagery cannot settle the argument once and for all. However, it does confirm that at least two German tanks advanced south towards Cagny from the direction of Emiéville on the morning of 18 July 1944. This is clear from the tracks they left through one of the wheat fields. They emerged from the hedgerow north of the village. One was destroyed soon afterwards, while the other joined a track heading towards Cagny. Its subsequent fate is unclear, but a shell track strongly suggests that it engaged a British tank that was also under fire from the south. The tanks had apparently been located by someone who examined the hard-copy prints at high magnification many years ago, as their location had been marked on one of the frames with a black pen. The area where the tank tracks emerged, and the orientation of the shell track. The tracks left by one of the tanks. The second set of tank tracks, slightly further north; the shell track originates in this area and does not appear in the wheat field right of the farm access lane. In summary, the scope and limitations of the air photographs must be kept firmly in mind when they are used as historical sources. They may contain a wealth of detail, but there are significant constraints in terms of both resolution and clarity. Beyond this, the air photos record only one specific situation at a particular time. They tell us far less about the previous chronology of events at the location concerned. Nevertheless, the imagery captured over Cagny on the morning of 18 July 1944 broadly supports Hans von Luck’s story. Von Luck made no claims whatsoever about the Luftwaffe flak battery’s actions during his first visit to Cagny that day. He stated only that he ordered them to move to a location northwest of the village - an orchard that offered clear views out across the wheat fields and towards the British armoured corridor. His account of their subsequent role was based on his second visit to Cagny, by which time, on his own admission, other German units, including Becker’s, were active in the area. In keeping with this narrative, the imagery confirms the presence of extensive German defences north and northeast of Cagny by the mid-morning period, which were inflicting significant losses on the British armour. Heavy fire was clearly emanating from the one area of the photograph that matches von Luck’s description of where the Luftwaffe 88s were positioned, and objects are visible at this location in both vertical and oblique imagery. The Germans also deployed anti-tank guns and self-propelled assault guns around Cagny. Beyond this, the photographs record the movement of German tanks from the northeast towards Cagny and the apparent destruction of at least one of these tanks near the village. However, the unit involved and the reason for their movement south must remain the subject of conjecture, and we will probably never know for certain whether the tank was destroyed by Allied or German fire.

The Crusader tank, also known as Mk VI or A15 Crusader was among one of the primary tanks used by the British army during World War II. During the North

B 9098. A REME sergeant welding damaged armour on a Cromwell tank of 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry at 29th Armoured Brigade workshops 11th Armoured Division 8 August 1944

Operation Goodwood in Normandy, France was a British offensive against the German forces at the end of July 1944. It is called by some historians as ‘the